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Foreword 
 
This paper marks for me the culmination of ruminations that began with the study of 
Plato’s Allegory of the Cave, studies of Emile Durkheim’s anomie, Martin Heidegger’s Being 
and Time, and ended with the emergence of a worldview that encompasses the current 
predicament faced by the postmodern individual. By investigating the construction of identity, 
and the rampant devaluation of traditional values in our current society, I thought there must be a 
common source; it has been the search for this source that has led me to this thesis over the last 
four years, perhaps, going back even farther. My time as student pursuing a philosophy degree 
exposed me to the works of philosophers that have given me the proper nomenclature and 
lexicon to be able to formulate this process of devaluation I see every day in society. As well, 
though, as I believe that individuals in the United States possess varying degrees of nihilism, I 
have faith that the individual will subscribe to valuations that empower, not hinder.  
For to be honest, if one is to understand the power structure in the West as representing 
the vast multitude of subjects at the bottom, overseen by the very few at the top, and if power 
and its attendant, authority, do not come simply from the possession of money, then power must 
come in the form of either truth, freedom, authenticity and/or subscribing to traditional 
valuations already possessing the positive power of not only participation in them, but also, 
intrinsically, the historical legitimacy of culture and custom. This fact may not be entirely 
elucidated by the following work; instead, the impression may be that subjectively subscribed 
valuation is a source of “surrogate” power, or “the power of the powerless” as it exists for the 
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disenfranchised denizen at the bottom of the socio-economic power structure, a proposition I am 
hesitant to fully make. At least, though, through the aesthetic active participation of producing 
art, or the project of artful living, perhaps the individual may again approach truth, freedom, and 
authenticity.  
Lastly, this work does not fully explore all the various angles and prescriptions for 
overcoming the disenfranchisement of universal commodification. Much of the work I did 
exploring this topic took me in the direction Nicholas Gane took in his work Max Weber and 
Postmodern Theory, whereby he used the sociological work of Max Weber and worked it out 
through three French postmodernists: Lyotard, Baudrillard, and Foucoult. This current paper 
deviates from this approach, exploring the source of the nihilism through the phenomenological 
position of the German dialecticians. Though, in the future, I wish to explore the notions of 
Baudrillard’s erotic sphere, and more specifically, how sex may correlate to aesthetic objects as 
perhaps objects that contain not only mystery, but also, perhaps negatively, the potential for 
danger and death; the dialectic relationship between Eros and Thanatos that may or may not 
correlate to creation or annihilation that exist together within mystery objects. 
 
 Franklin Fehrman 
 New Orleans, 2017 
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Abstract 
 The last half of the twentieth century into the twenty-first century, in the West, has been 
referred to as postmodern. Postmodernity represents a stage in a society after having passed 
through a nihilism, itself produced by the universal commodification inherent in late stage 
capitalism. Here we explore the progress of devaluation through Adorno’s negative dialects to 
ascertain the potential for truth and authenticity in the object. Informing Adorno’s negative 
dialectics, were Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Through their dialectics, Adorno postulated the effect of 
commodities, as objects, within the first part of the 20th century, and how the lack of potential for 
truth and freedom in these objects anticipated the nihilism of both the late capitalism period, into 
the postmodern period. This nihilism itself, was anticipated by Nietzsche. Further, this entire 
focus on and influence of commodities on the individual, from the early twentieth century to the 
present is referred to as the commodity structure and itself can be equated to Heidegger’s falling 
prey. Once the subject has had the valuation or meaning of their lives stripped via this universal 
commodification of the commodity structure, this paper will argue through the works of 
Heidegger and Nietzsche and the role of the aesthetic, only then can the subject in the 
postmodern period reclaim qua participation in one’s own becoming towards both truth and 
authenticity, as well as freedom. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: aesthetic, commodification, nihilism, negative dialectics, authenticity. 
 
vii 
 
 
  
1 
 
Introduction 
 In the last century, a shift to late stage capitalism has left the individual subject in a state 
of disillusionment and decline, due to an inherent nihilism via universal commodification. 
Contrary to the work of the eighteenth century German Idealists, such as Kant, Hegel and Marx, 
postmodern thinkers recognized that “the Enlightenment ‘project’ of liberating humanity from 
servitude and superstition had not only failed in its aims but had actually produced more 
powerful myths and even more absolute forms of domination” (Bennett 3). Specific to the work 
of Kant and Hegel is the relation between the subject and the object, what was referred to as a 
dialectical relation. The negative determination of Hegel, became the positive ascension of the 
individual, as Absolute Spirit, to the higher forms of culture and civilization. Later, it was Marx 
who had coined the ‘material dialectic’, placed across history that posited a final conflict that 
would end in Utopia, usurping the disenchanting capitalism blooming in the nineteenth century. 
 At the beginning of the twentieth century, though, the nature of capitalism began to take 
on a different role: “late capitalism should be seen less as a continuation of classical or monopoly 
capitalism than as a ‘different ‘order’ of commodification,’ and that this last order is itself only 
one among several processes of de-differentiation at work in postmodernity as a whole” 
(Miklitsch 80). This late capitalism became more and more revolved around the commodity, 
which took on the quality of structures; technological characteristics of mass production. For if 
the commodity itself could be referred to as an artificial object, as such, then the dialectic 
relation between subject and object would therefore change as well. This dialectic itself, as 
observed by Adorno, took the form of a negative dialectic; or a regression, or tension between 
the subject and the object. But the form itself is “anti-systematic” (Adorno 122); instead it should 
be seen as more of a method of critically analyzing the objects we encounter, for the potential of 
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truth and authenticity. This act itself is a form of intellectual freedom (Ibid. 84, 89). The subject, 
using negative dialects, is able to ascertain that truth, freedom, and authenticity, do not exist in 
the commodity objects of the commodity structure, and must then create art objects to provide 
these qualities or must overcome their own falling prey-ness as the “objectified” subject and 
become authentic Beings.  
The state of universal commodification “assimilates personal attributes, relations and 
desired states of affairs to the realm of objects by assuming that all human attributes are 
possessions bearing a value characterizable in money terms, and by implying that all these 
possessions can and should be separable from persons to be exchanged through the free market” 
(Radin 6), I would argue, bears a striking similarity to Heidegger’s mode of being, falling prey. 
Further, universal commodification is, in essence, the same thing as reification which “refers to 
the moment that a process or relation is generalized into an abstraction . . . [and] refers to the 
generation of a ‘phantom objectivity’, meaning that a human creation—an institution or an 
ideology, say—takes on the character of a ‘force that controls human beings’” (Bewes 3-4). We 
will associate this process of reification, and its consequences with the term commodity 
structure. 
 Once universal commodification alienates the relation between subject and object by 
changing the qualities of the objects encountered in the world of artifice, the subject is left 
unmoored from the potentialities of both truth and authenticity, as well as of freedom. The world 
of artifice is simply the world of man-made manufactured existence, not the natural world. This 
unmooring, existent in the falling prey of the commodity structure, turns into nihilism, as defined 
by Nietzsche in his Will To Power. This nihilism ultimately then becomes a choice for the 
subject in the commodity structure; does one be the last man, or the Ubermensch? For if the 
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object, given as commodity lacks the potentiality for truth and authenticity, via the prior concept 
of dialects, then one should seek or create objects that possess truth and authenticity, 
characteristics I would argue, are found in aesthetic objects. Further, participation in this 
choosing and creating of objects of truth and authenticity, I would argue, also resemble the same 
type of freedom intimated in Nietzsche’s notion of becoming. Participation in authenticity also 
invokes Heidegger, who we will also explore. Needless to say, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and 
Adorno all share the common stance, namely, that from the despair or angst that comes from 
living in a state of nihilism and inauthenticity arises the ground or starting point for authenticity 
as well as becoming. 
 In Part One, we will introduce the method of negative dialectics. To do this we will 
approach Adorno biographically, that is, how did he come to form the negative dialectics? We 
will start with the influence he received from his childhood tutor on Kant. We will see, then, how 
Hegel’s Absolute Idealism and its “triadic” dialectic (Adorno 6) gave Adorno the framework to 
his negative dialectics. We will then explore how through its employment, the faults unmasked 
in both Kant and Hegel systems, helped him to develop his theory. We will then ask, “what is 
negative dialectics?”, and further why is it an appropriate tool for our current critique? 
In Part Two, we will explore the implications of commodification. We will start by 
examining Marx’s commodity fetishism and how this aspect of earlier capitalism turned into the 
commodity structure of the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century. As well, we will 
explore four aspects of objects, Heidegger’s “innerworldly things at hand” (Heidegger 1996: 
103), or objects at hand; commodities, which we will define via Marx; technology, being a 
quality of late capitalistic commodities, and its implications on subject/object relations; and 
lastly, art objects. An important distinction must here be made that the objects we are concerned 
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with exist in the Greek term nous, or of human origin and not per se the physis, or natural world 
though obviously, nature provides all the materia for artificial objects. After delineating these 
four types of objects, we will describe their interrelation. After this, we will must define how the 
concepts of “truth” and “freedom” may be found in the object via the subject.  
In Part Three, we will examine the correlation between the commodity structure and 
Heidegger’s falling prey and Nietzsche’s nihilism. As well, we will try to show how this nihilism 
characterized by the commodity structure nature of falling prey is produced by universal 
commodification. We will go into some detail of Heidegger’s falling prey in order to show how 
it ties into inauthenticity. This inauthenticity, I argue, is the predominant quality of participation 
in the commodity structure. As well, by showing the inauthenticity of the commodity structure, I 
intend in the following section to illustrate how authenticity may be achieved. By extrapolating 
on Nietzsche’s nihilism, we anticipate the ways in which through the active participation of 
becoming, the subject, already intimately doomed through the interrelation with the commodified 
object, may resurrect themselves.  
In Part Four, we begin by readdressing the contemporary state of post-modernism and its 
implications. Then I will give my definition of art object, and explain how it satisfies a role of 
authenticity via Heidegger, as well as of truth. Approaching the art object via Nietzsche, we find 
similarities between the unintentional viewing of the object, and the intoxication necessary for 
the creation of the art object. This unintentionality is contra Husserl’s definition of 
intentionality, which we will explore in the first section. Further, after passing through nihilism, 
into the post-modern, the subject as object is faced with two choices, the first to continue to fall 
prey, and the second choice may well be referred to as the art of living. This art of living, is the 
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subject participating in itself as the art object, which represents the freedom of the subject in the 
postmodern period, parallel to Nietzsche’s concept of the Übermensch. 
Methodology and Assumptions 
 The approach taken throughout this work is postmodernist in its basic thrust, and much of 
the terminology reflects this. As well, many of the terms come from the phenomenological and 
German idealist tradition. Therefore, the following terms are here defined for the reader to obtain 
some clarity: 
Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics is the approach to objects encountered whereby the positive 
appearance negatively reveals what it does not show. An example comes from Maurice Merleau-
Ponty whereby the angle one view a glass, negatively provides that there is the side one does not 
see. 
“Constellation of Construction”: This term comes from the work of Walter Benjamin and means 
that objects hold within them ideas and or facts about the reality that constructed them. 
Intentionality: This term comes from Edmund Husserl and regards the conscious and purposeful 
viewing of an object or one of its facets so as to allow it to be more well understood. 
Sublimation: Sublimation is the conscious act of categorizing an object rationally thus 
consciously bounding the object, and at the same time, actively intertwining oneself with the 
reality of the object. 
Factic/Factically: This is a Heideggerian phrase simply implying the reality of the subject and the 
world one inhabits. 
They-self: A Heideggerian term meaning other subjects existent in our lives who inform and 
consensually manufacture the given world to us. 
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Falling Prey: A Heideggerian term meaning the act of participating in the consensually 
manufactured, inauthentic world of the They-self. 
Angst: A Heideggerian term that is equitable to a moment of uncertainty experienced by the 
individual if and when they begin to question the authenticity of the given world of the They-
self. 
Negative Dialectics: A dialectical exercise utilized by the individual to repurpose the more 
traditional dialectic relationship between the subject and the object whereby the truth and 
progress is not given by a triadic thesis-antithesis-synthesis dialectic. The third term, 
representing an apex to the first two, the synthesis is denied and the dialectic relationship 
between the subject and object is analyzed by the thinking subject whereby either the object 
reveals hermeneutically that which it is not displaying, or the consciousness sees the subject and 
object relationship and then seeks hermeneutically truth, freedom, and authenticity in the 
negative space between the two. As well, the dialectical relationship itself can be stepped back 
from and seen in a detached manner whereby the dialectic relationship itself negatively reveals 
positivistic truth, freedom and authenticity. 
Reification: Similar to sublimation and the “constellation of construction”, whereby the object 
represents concretized thought and/or social and cultural reality. 
Da-sein: The individual or subject. 
Being-in/of-the-world: The reality consensually constructed by others implying a participatory 
role. 
Phenomenology: The practice systemizing existence via the empirically observed phenomena 
thus experienced by the subject. 
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Encompassed: Similar to sublimation, this term means to consciously encompass an object or 
event. 
Aesthetics: The field of thought in pursuit of art and its relationship to bigger ideas such as 
beauty and truth.  
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Part One: Negative Dialectics 
 In order to understand the negative dialectics of Adorno, it is important to understand the 
general positive positions of the main dialecticians that informed him; Kant and Hegel. We will 
also need to explain the purpose for utilizing Adorno’s negative dialectics at all, specifically how 
it uses hermeneutics, mimetics and thus, how it may provide the truth and freedom of the object.  
 In the first place, we must begin by understanding Kant’s influence on Adorno. “In 1918-
1919, while Germany was reeling from military defeat and political upheaval, the fifteen-year-
old Adorno studied music and spent his weekend hours reading Kant” (Buck-Morss 2). This 
influence on Adorno, had the original effect of instilling in him the Kantian notion that “we 
cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in position at least to think 
them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there 
can be appearance without anything that appears” (Kant 27). This also ties into Kant’s famous 
Copernican Revolution, whereby Adorno “reversed the polarity of the relation between subject 
and object, [and] gave, as he later worded it [the] ‘Copernican Revolution an axial turn,’ so that 
nonidentity became the very basis of knowledge” (Buck Morss 83). The Copernican Revolution 
of Kant was famous for turning the philosopher’s attention away from the object’s influence on 
the subject and analyzing the conceptual categorization and mutual interdependence of the 
thinking subject with the object.  As well, Adorno’s earlier Kantian teachings also provided him 
with the necessary conflict between subject and object: 
If later, in regard to the traditional philosophical texts, I not so 
much let myself be impressed by their unity and systematic 
coherence as I concerned myself with the play of opposing and 
conflicting forces which [go] on under the surface of every self-
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contained theoretical position, and which codified philosophy 
sometimes accounts for as force-field, then it was certainly 
Kracauer [ed. his tutor] who gave me the idea. He made the 
Critique of Pure Reason present to me not simply as a system of 
transcendental idealism. Much more, he showed me . . . how the 
most eloquent parts of the work are the wounds which the conflict 
in the theory leaves behind. (Buck-Morss 80) 
To be sure, the breaks he found in the works of Kant were between the phenomena and the 
noumena; the concept and the reality. Yet, later, in his use of the “monadical abbreviations” or 
“constellations of constructions”  (ibid. 112, 176) deciphered through the mimetic, 
hermeneutical nature of the negative dialectic, which we will address later, Adorno was able to 
solve the “riddle of the idealists” from the standpoint of treating the subject and object, together 
as “inextricably bound” (ibid. 112) elements thereby reflecting the two under the reified 
relationship of the commodity structure; negating the dialectal question altogether in the favor 
of seeking the antinomies residing in whatever system he applied this negative gaze at, as well 
as finding the negative relationship between the dialectic itself and consciousness in a negative 
space. 
 We will now address the influence of Hegel on Adorno’s thinking. For starters, Hegel’s 
logic consists of a triadic relationship between the subject and the object, instigating a third 
phase, that represents the synthesis, thereby informing the next progressed level’s thesis or 
subjective position. In a sense, the relation between the two facilitates the revealing of the 
subject to itself through encountering the object. Further, Hegel’s logic is mapped across 
history, whereby the pinnacle of the dialectic represents a return of Spirit to itself represented in 
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nineteenth century German civilization. The level’s rise from the subject through the object, 
lays the foundation to higher levels of relations, up through familial relations, to the instance of 
society and civilization up to higher forms of human achievement in the forms of culture, 
philosophy, and religion.  
 Specifically, important to Hegel’s dialectic is the negative nature of the subject, or the 
determinant nature of the subject: 
. . . this idea is that the subject, which as thinking subject criticizes 
given institutions, represents the first instance the emancipation of 
the spirit. And, as the emancipation of the spirit, it represents the 
decisive transition from its mere being-in-itself to a being-for-
itself. In other words, the stage that has been reached here is one in 
which spirit confronts objective realities, social realities . . . this 
subjectivity is a mere aspect that has turned self into an absolute; it 
overlooks the fact that it owes its own substance, its forms, its very 
existence to the objective forms and existence of society; and that 
it actually becomes conscious of itself by conceiving of the 
seemingly alien and even repressive institutions as being like itself, 
by comprehending them as subjective and perceiving them in their 
necessity. (Adorno 14) 
Adorno is trying to depart from the Idealist aspect of Hegel’s system. Specifically, the function 
by which Hegel uses determinant negation of the subject to create a positive, affirming system. 
Further, he repurposes this negation found in Hegel from the relation between subject and object, 
and as mentioned in the above section on Kant, after denying the original dialectical question of 
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subject/object, he then uses this negative approach of the philosopher to negatively reveal the 
truth, freedom and thence authenticity in the negative space between the subject and object. That 
is, the original dialectic between subject and object was part of the process, as Hegel had termed 
it, of a determinant negation in a positive fashion. Adorno saw the negative aspect itself as the 
process whereby truth and freedom would be revealed to a thinking subject: “The negativity I am 
speaking about contains a pointer to what Hegel calls determinate negation. In other words, 
negativity of this kind is made concrete and goes beyond mere standpoint philosophy by 
confronting concepts with their objects, and, conversely, objects with their concepts. Negativity 
in itself, if such a concept were not nonsensical—since by virtue of its being in itself, a concept 
that exists essentially only in context, i.e. for others, turns into its own opposite” (Adorno 25).  
 Before discussing the negative dialectics as a tool for subject approaching the object, and 
the similarities between hermeneutics and the relation to mimetics, we must explain that for 
Adorno history had proven itself as not positive, and that the Enlightenment promise of reason 
being the salvation for humanity had obviously failed, evidenced by the use and shadow of the 
atomic bomb, and the instance of the Holocaust in the West. Therefore, if truth and freedom 
were no longer found in the dialectical systems of Hegel and Marx, then what was the access 
point for the subject to attain truth and notions of freedom. We are not including authenticity 
here, because we will need to address in the following section how the commodity structure 
relates to the notion of falling prey, and how the objects found in late capitalistic countries are 
such that through their inauthenticity, they breed nihilism. This will allow for a more thorough 
conversation on authenticity.  
 As I mentioned, the negative dialectics utilizes hermeneutics and mimetics. Hermeneutics 
is utilized extensively in existential philosophers such as Sartre, as well as phenomenological 
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thinkers such as Heidegger and Paul Ricouer. Hermeneutics is the idea that “every understanding 
lights up its objects only against a background that cannot at the same time be brought into the 
light” (Melchert G-3). Put another way, it may be said that the interpretation of the object itself 
reveals unnoticed truths, tacitly contained in the factic nature of the subject, revealed by the 
object. This also relates to mimetics, whereby “visibly ‘given’ objects were translated into terms 
of nonvisible social process” whereby the elements revealed concepts not in a synthetic sense, 
but that the phenomena “illuminated contradictions” (Buck-Morss 102).  
 Another important aspect of the negative dialectics, which we will bring back up later is 
the way that art and aesthetics are an important remedy to postmodern nihilism, through the 
notion of unintentionality. In fact, this unintentionality informs the basis of truth found in 
objects. If we can understand that for Husserl, intentionality was a requisite for the bracketing off 
of objects for phenomenological hermeneutics, for Adorno, the unintentionality found in the 
negative space between the subject and object revealed the mimetic nature of both the subject 
and the object. Here, Adorno’s great friend Walter Benjamin explains: 
Truth never enters into a relation, and particularly not an 
intentional one. The object of knowledge as something determined 
within conceptual intention is not truth. Truth, built out of ideas 
[rather than appearing within them], is unintentional being. The 
procedure which adequately conforms to it is therefore not an 
intending within the knowing process, but entering into [truth] and 
disappearing. Truth is the death of intention. (Buck-Morss 77) 
Put another way, for Adorno the potentiality for truth was not given by the object, but requires 
the thinking subject to interpret, albeit and mystically, unintentionally. 
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The ability of the subject to interpret represents a form of autonomy and freedom we 
made mention of earlier when we posited that the negative relation provides truth and freedom. 
For the subject exists in a social world consentually constructed, a constitution of our being. But 
this constitution is given to us by the commodity structure. Put another way, the givenness of 
Heidegger’s They-self in a state of falling prey. By approaching the object unintentionally, we 
secure knowledge and truth, and the speculative subject attains a greater understanding both of 
the illusory nature of the givenness of the world, and negatively, the conscious overcoming of 
this state of being. This differentiation between “socially necessary illusion” (Adorno 100) and 
the active form of enquiry, or resistance, as Adorno refers to the practice of philosophy, 
“transcends the objects while remaining closely in touch with them” (ibid 107). And where our 
thoughts, confronted by objects, reach a depth that leaves some thoughts uncategorized and new, 
“[t]his speculative surplus that goes beyond whatever is the case, beyond mere existence, is the 
element of freedom in thought, and because it is, because it alone does stand for freedom, 
because it represents the tiny quantum of freedom we possess, it also represents the happiness of 
thought” (ibid. 108) 
 The purpose of this section has been to demonstrate what the negative dialectic is in a 
very brief fashion. What has been important, has been to illustrate that the dialectic itself 
represents a novel turn from the subject/object relation inherent in the works of Hegel as well as 
the way in which it may be used to attain truth and freedom from the object, in general. Just as 
important is that this dialectical illustration represents an active confrontation of the subjects 
consciousness with the negative space existent between subject and object, and thus 
consciousness with the dialectic in general. This negative aspect will be important later in the 
section on aesthetics, by way of both Heidegger and Nietzsche. Further, the negative relation to 
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the dialectics of the subject/object, frees the subject from the inauthentic aspect of the object as 
commodity encountered to a greater extent in the world. In the next section, we are going to 
explore commodity structure that has developed at the turn of the nineteenth century, and 
continued up until the present.  
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Part Two: The Object as Commodity 
 The purpose of this section deviates from the discussion of negative dialectics in order to 
explain the types of objects encountered in late capitalistic countries. The other purpose is to 
provide the ground by which we may illustrate and prove the nihilism that follows from 
universal commodification which makes up the commodity structure, or, the factic matrix of late 
capitalistic countries. Lastly, we need to illustrate how this crucial quality of the commodity 
structure breeds nihilism so that we may come to a post-nihilistic order in the guise of post-
modernity and the salvation of the subject in the last part. 
 It is important here to delineate the nuanced differences between what we mean by 
objects encountered in the world. This list is not all encompassing, nor does it pretend to be 
exhaustive; it is an attempt to categorize objects given at once in the world and the potential 
quality thus found for truth and freedom for the subject. This important and will lead us to the 
final section, on the aesthetic potential for freedom and authenticity. For now, we will describe 
the types of objects most commonly encountered, and then how reification informs the 
commodity structure and how this commodity structure objectifies the subject. As well, we must 
reiterate that these are objects of artifice, not of nature. 
 The first type of object is a category for objects that I am borrowing from Heidegger’s 
concept of “things” such that they exist neutrally as objects that populate our existence. I will refer 
to them as objects at hand, and they imply a degree of utility. This borrowing from Heidegger does 
not intend on including his notion of a totality of worldly things (Heidegger 1996: 62-71), and is 
not meant for our purposes to indicate those objects that Heidegger used in his phenomenological 
enterprise Being and Time as an initial interfacing of Dasein factically with the being-of-the-world. 
Though, similarly to our position, one might argue that once we have explained the relationship 
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between reification and the commodity structure, and the commodity structure to falling prey one 
might be tempted to make greater comparisons. For now, I will say that these objects at hand have 
the non-spectacular quality of being consciously encompassed (Jaspers 227-228). What this means 
is that consciously the subject has already overcome or delimited the potentiality for the object to 
transcend its own parameters of being; that is, the subject overcomes the object consciously and 
anticipates its horizons, not to be exceeded. Further, these objects at hand tend to always have the 
quality of fungibility, a characteristic of commodities (Radin 118). Fungibility is the property of 
goods to be mutually transferable, one to the other mostly through the medium of capital. Lastly, 
there exists an initial novelty for the being of these objects at hand when they start as a commodity, 
which gradually digresses into a habitual taken-for-grantedness.  
 The second type of object is the commodity. We find in Marx’s Capital: “The commodity 
is, first of all, an external object, a thing which through its qualities satisfies human needs of 
whatever kind. The nature of these needs whether they arise from the stomach or the imagination, 
makes no difference” (Marx 125). For our purposes, we should think of the commodity as an object 
instantly encompassed. That is, when the subject sees the commodified object the subject itself has 
already arrested the potentiality for the object as commodity to be overcome. Margaret Radin uses 
“four indicia of commodification in conceptualization”: 1) objectification, 2) fungibility, 3) 
commensurability and 4) money equivalence (Radin 118). Commodity represents an object that 
will greatly inform our further discussion on the commodity structure and its implications. Lastly, 
commodified objects, or objects with a monetary value, make up nearly every artificial 
environment that Western subject finds themselves in. 
 Thirdly, is the object of technology, itself a commodity with the quality of enrapturing the 
subject by way of guile and glamour. Put another way, technology, as object, is instantly 
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encompassed as an object, and thus, can pass into the taken-for-grantedness of an object at hand 
in the sense of hammer or a calculator. It also has the potentiality to remain novel in that objects 
of technology act as platforms for an endless stream of content or novel media. Technology has 
the potential of suspending the subject within the commodity structure, arresting his or her 
transcendence by disallowing the interpretative action of seeing the relation between subject/object 
within the negative space of unintentionality. Further, as the subject becomes more enamored with 
more consciously immersive forms of technology, the subject sinks further into its own reified 
existence, thus denying the inherent freedom I referred to earlier, potentialized in the object, as 
such. Adorno refers to this tendency of technology as a form of fascism in his Minima Moralia: 
“Technology is making gestures precise and brutal and with them men . . . The movements 
machines demand of their users already [has the] violent, hard-hitting, unresting jerkiness of 
Fascist maltreatment. Not the least to blame for the withering of experience is the fact that things, 
under the law of pure functionality, assume a form that limits contact with them to mere operation 
and tolerates no surplus, either in freedom [emphasis mine] of conduct or in [the] autonomy of 
things, which would survive as the core of experience, because it is not consumed by the moment 
of action” (Buck-Morss 181).  
 The last object, I posit, is the art object. The art object is what I will be exploring in the 
last section of this work and I will define its parameters then. For now, I will say that the art object 
has the quality of immediately not being overcome. As well, in the fact that it cannot be 
encompassed, it also stands as an object that allows for the necessary observation of the negative 
space before intimated. We will see later, how this negative space relates to Nietzsche’s 
intoxication. Further, as the subject itself increasingly becomes objectified and therefore 
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commodified, the redemptory path of the subject in post-modern times becomes an active form of 
nihilism and then to becoming; the subject takes on the quality of an art object. 
 The relation between the objects is such that: a) all commodities are artificial and represent 
an objectification, as such; b) all objects of technology are commodities; c) no art objects are either 
objects at hand, nor commodities; d) objects at hand are almost always commodities, though, if 
they start as art objects (such as, for example, an “artisanal hammer”, or a handmade pen), they 
eventually lose their quality of not being encompassed and fall into taken-for-grantedness; e) art 
objects, in the very fact that they cannot be commodities and thus do not participate in the 
commodity structure, possess authenticity, and this authenticity, as a quality, can never be 
diminished; and lastly f) objects at hand do not necessarily possess, by way of their utility, the 
quality of inauthenticity per se, but if they formerly existed as  commodities and not as artisanal 
objects at hand, they can never possess the quality of authenticity. 
 One of the most important turns for this argument comes from understanding how the 
reification of objects into commodities comes to create the commodity structure. The answer 
comes from Georg Lukacs:  
The commodity can only be understood in its undistorted essence 
when it becomes the universal category of society as a whole. Only 
in this context does the reification produced by commodity 
relations [emphasis mine] assume decisive importance both for the 
objective evolution of society and for the stance adopted by men 
towards it. Only then does the commodity become crucial for the 
subjugation of men’s consciousness to the forms in which this 
reification finds expression and for their attempts to comprehend the 
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process or to rebel against its disastrous effects and liberate 
themselves from servitude to the ‘second nature’ so created. (Lukacs 
86) 
The ‘second nature’ Lukacs refers to is the permeating acceptance and reinforcement of the status 
quo and participatory reinforcement of “universal commodification” (Radin 2-6), or the 
commodification of everything. 
 We need to understand two important implications: 1) capitalism has created within 
countries that practice it a commodity structure through reification. This is a factic reality simply 
by observing the ubiquitous nature of commodities, objects of technology, and objects at hand in 
our everyday lives. Further, these three categories of objects all lack the immediate quality of an 
intoxicating negative space. That is, by the very nature of our subjective entanglement with them 
in our own constitution of falling prey, they represent objects that do not possess the potential as 
objects for the subject to acquire truth or freedom as defined above. Therefore, existence in the 
commodity structure for those in the First World countries is defined by a lack of truth, freedom 
as well as authenticity.  
 The second implication develops from the first, namely that as this time period we are 
living in is referred to as late capitalism. In this era, we could say the universal commodification 
has reached its pinnacle. In a negative sense, the commodification of objects, events and traditional 
forms of valuation has actually devalued their actual worth. Therefore, lacking the proper access 
to value, as well as truth, freedom and authenticity, the subject is left to manufacture meaning, 
pastiche-ing together identity and meaning from commodities. This further reiterates the negative 
position of Adorno, that there has not been an ascent, historically, but indeed, a descent. For, in 
contrast to the positive dialectics of both Marx and Hegel, peoples in capitalistic countries, 
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specifically First World countries in the late capital stage, have become moored in the falling prey-
ness of the commodity structure and have had their former achievements, accurately described by 
Hegel as culture, religion, the family, philosophy, and art devalued, replaced, and/or commodified.  
 Up until now, we have used the term late capitalism without giving a proper definition. But 
having now explained the relation between reification, commodification and how both inform and 
have produced the commodity structure, we can now lay out what late capitalism is. The 
commodity structure of late capitalism “should be seen less as a continuation of classical or 
monopoly capitalism than as a’ different ‘order’ of commodification,’ and that this last order is 
itself only one among several processes of differentiation at work in postmodernity as a whole” 
(Miklitsch 80). We will explore postmodernity more in the last part on the aesthetic redemption.  
 This leads us to our next part: nihilism. The position I take is that nihilism is the inevitable 
consequence of the negative valuation via commodification. Further, the subject, entangled with 
the object of commodity, begins to apply commodity valuation to himself, thus devaluing him or 
herself. The nihilism comes from the lack of truth, freedom and authenticity the subject seeks, and 
yet does not find in the majority of objects found in the commodity structure of a late capitalistic 
existence. As well this nihilism acts in tandem with the falling prey aspect of the factic reality of 
existence in those places. So, we will explore Heidegger’s falling prey, as well as Nietzsche’s 
nihilism. The goal is such that by exposing that we exist to a greater and greater extent in a nihilistic 
existence, we may only then, by accepting our reality, work at creating meaning and valuation in 
our lives aesthetically. 
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Part Three: Commodity Structure Falling Prey-ness and Nihilism 
 In this section, we will begin by showing the similarities between Heidegger’s conception 
of falling prey and the commodity structure. This concept of falling prey also informs the idea of 
inauthenticity. Further, we will show the similarities between the devaluation of values inherent in 
universal commodification and Nietzsche’s nihilism. These two philosophers will also inform the 
redemptive nature of the aesthetic in final section, and therefore are even more pertinent to our 
discussion. Lastly, it is important to understand that nihilism marks a transitory phase in the 
progress of capitalism to late capitalism and thence to post-modernity, and occurs sometime 
between classical capitalism and late capitalism. Once nihilism has set in, this informs post-
modernity, but not after. 
 In the first place, we are going to explore how Heidegger’s falling prey, as a structural 
development of Da-sein’s being as care, works in tandem with the commodity structure. Falling 
prey also perpetuates reification and both inform the nature of the commodity structure of late 
capitalism and “take on the character of ‘a force that controls human beings’” (Bewes 3-4). 
Reification is the process by which the commodity structure supports conformity with its given 
valuations. Contrast the definition of reification just given to that of falling prey. Falling prey is a 
constitution of being-in-the-world, a form of participation, that is defined also as entanglement 
(Heidegger 1996: 164) Through the idle talk with others (the “They”, or other people existing in 
and amongst us in our “fallen” state of inauthentic existence), pure curiosity bereft of 
understanding, and the ambiguity by which authentic objects, such as the event of dying are 
informed by others. The principle characteristic of falling prey, as it pertains to our current work, 
is the givenness of the world via universal commodification. 
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 Another important consideration of falling prey is that it is not limited to late capitalist 
countries. The “They” that informs the subject (Dasein) is contingent on the factic reality of the 
specific time and culture of the specific country one is in. Let me put it another way. As a 
constitution of the being of the subject, falling prey relates to the way the subject takes for granted 
notions, or in our case, objects in the form of commodities, in such a way that the very makeup of 
the individual becomes synonymous with the World as informed by the They-self. The example 
Heidegger gives is that we build within ourselves the notion of death given by the They-self. But 
the problem occurs because the individual understands that the if he or she does not understand 
death as a potentiality that has not yet occurred, then neither has anyone else and thereby contains 
within it the seeds of its own undermining. To understand how this translates to our treatment, we 
need to consider the next important quality of Heidegger’s falling prey. 
 Heidegger also relates the falling prey of the They-self with the quality of informed 
perceptions given, as being inherently inauthentic. That is, the individual who lives according to 
the consensual givenness of the They-self is in effect living inauthentically, because he or she is 
ultimately accepting what is given from others without pursuing truth or freedom, qualities that 
would possessed in one who was creating their own authentic existence through active 
participation. This is an important point, and again, one that anticipates Nietzsche’s redemptive 
participation of aesthetic becoming. Further, we understand that falling prey, as a mode of 
existence is a preliminary to angst (Heidegger 1992: 156-204). Angst, in the same way as Adorno’s 
hermeneutics and mimetics, or his physiognomy, allows for the unconcealing of truth in the object. 
For angst seems to represent a negative moment of revealing of the inauthentic nature of given 
objects of the They-self. Adorno uses no such method to alleviate the angst of the individual faced 
with the inauthenticity of the “object” thus given; for him, the physiognomy allowed the thinking 
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subject to behold the object such to reveal “constellations of constructions” (Buck-Morss 176) 
embedded in the object. The important point here, though, is that the givenness of the They-self 
nearly completely parallels the inauthenticity of the “objects” given by the commodity structure. 
 Heidegger’s schema is important to understand the character of the commodity culture of 
late capital countries and how it behaves. As well, Heidegger’s notion of falling prey is not itself 
a malevolent force; a part of its dynamic is its function as everydayness towards the world 
whichever world that may be for the subject. For our purposes, the world we are describing is late 
capitalism via commodity structure and reification, which themselves have negative effects on the 
subject. The way that the subject is informed in a state of falling prey, as commodity structure, 
bleeds into the individual making them vulnerable as the subject then starts to associate themselves 
with the object: “objectification comes about through commodification when our cultural rhetoric 
conceives of certain attributes of the person [in much the same way] as commodities that can be 
bought and sold” (Radin 156). Thus, “objectification can be internalized; as, for example, when 
women conceive of themselves some aspects as sex objects for men’s use. Personhood is 
compromised from within as well as from without” (ibid. 157). Here, we may interchangeably take 
the word “personhood” and interchangeably use it with the word “identity”. The implications of 
this will become clear for us in Nietzsche’s becoming. The last point here is that the process of 
subjective objectification becoming commodification is a subjective process and saturates 
individuals to varying degrees. 
 The last point I will make about Heidegger’s falling prey constitution and how it informs 
the quality of givenness of the current commodity structure is how it informs inauthenticity, and 
thereby negatively unconceals authenticity. In other words, if it wasn’t for the very nature of 
inauthenticity, and thereby the general relationship of the informing “They” and the subject, we 
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wouldn’t be able to recognize that the nature of what is given, in this case objects of commodity, 
are inherently without authenticity. Further, by recognizing that the nature of commodification 
thus undermines the valuation of values through objectification, we may understand that the 
subject themselves participate in the process of becoming inauthentic. As we will see in the next 
section on aesthetics, the work itself is for the subject to create or produce either art objects, or as 
an already fallen objectified subject, the subject needs to participate in their own self-becoming.
 Nietzsche speaks of nihilism in two distinct ways that we may use to inform our current 
study. The first occurs, explicitly, in his Will to Power. The second example, in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, needs a little translation. In the former, as an explicit call to action, we understand 
how Nietzsche’s nihilistic bent of philosophy has much in common with Adorno, Heidegger, and 
the other existentialists: that the subject must indeed lose or have annihilated that which held value 
prior such that this ground level becomes the “worthless[ness] of the ground of creation” (Rosen 
199) whereby the subject must either “actively or reactively” (Rampley 218) choose his own way 
towards freedom and becoming. 
 Again, to reiterate my claim, this process itself, of pursuing a renewed relation between 
subject and object that has the negative space potential in the dialectical schema reclaiming truth, 
freedom and authenticity, represents a phase that comes after the capitalistic quality of universal 
commodification. This was the situation in Europe and the United States from the late eighteenth 
century, accelerating exponentially through the twentieth century until today, evolving into a post-
nihilistic phase that is aptly referred to as post-modernity. 
 As Nietzsche himself was writing in the late eighteen hundreds, he was cognizant of this 
potential trend, and in The Will to Power, we find the most explicit expressions of it. Firstly, 
Nietzsche recognizes that “European culture has been moving as toward a catastrophe, with a 
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tortured tension that is growing from decade to decade” (Nietzsche 1967: 3). Tied directly to this 
opening to his work is exactly the sentiment earlier stated, “For why has the advent of nihilism 
become necessary? Because the values we have had hitherto thus draw their final consequence; 
because nihilism represents the logical conclusion of our great values and ideals—because we 
must experience nihilism before we can find out what these ‘values’ really had.—We require, 
sometime, new values” (ibid. 4). As well, Nietzsche affirms my previous postulate, that nihilism 
represents a phase that capitalistic countries must pass through, as a consequence, for the “highest 
values devalue[ing] themselves” (ibid. 8). Of this prerequisite phase, Nietzsche writes: “[N]ihilism 
represents a pathological stage . . . [where the subject finds] . . . that there is no truth, that there is 
no absolute nature of things nor a ‘thing-in-itself’ . . . It places the value of things precisely in their 
lack of any reality corresponding to these values” (ibid. 14). The important point to make here is 
that this aptly coincides with the negative space found between commodified objects and the 
thinking subject a la Adorno and Heidegger. As we will see in the next section, this negative space 
represents a place of intoxication where art may flourish. 
 The second place where Nietzsche intimates nihilism, and where he begins to prescribe the 
way in which, in our study, the objectified subject, may participate in becoming, differentiated by 
notions of the last man and the Übermensch, is in his work Thus Spoke Zarathustra. As mentioned, 
the time period that Nietzsche lived in, with its increased alienation, a symptom of universal 
commodification, was already weakening the girders of traditional valuation. This devaluation of 
valuation and metaphysical concepts stemmed from the “death of God” (Milchman and Rosenberg 
47). Once we had these former metaphysical valuations, we could either accept the givenness of 
the inauthentic, nihilistic objects of the commodity structure, or actively pursue our own 
valuations; the former referring to the last man and reactive nihilism, and the latter referring to the 
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Übermensch, or active nihilism. “The hallmark of passive [reactive] nihilism, for Nietzsche, is ‘. . 
. a will to nothingness, an aversion to life, a rebellion against the most fundamental presuppositions 
of life’” (Ibid 48), taking on the characteristics of “complacency, happiness, contentment, and 
indifference”.  
 This almost state of the last man, almost perfectly mirrors the individual participating in 
the world of the They-self through the incorporation of objects of inauthenticity, or objects devoid 
of truth and freedom. In the next section, we will explore Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s notions of 
art, and the way in which the negative space postulated by Adorno is the source for the intoxication 
requisite for art objects. As well, we will explore the active participation required by both thinkers 
to overcome the givenness of inauthentic existence. 
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Part Four: Postmodernity and the Aesthetic Redemption of the Subject 
 In this section, we will refer back to Adorno’s negative dialectics from the first part, as a 
function for ascertaining the truth and freedom in the object, requisite for authentic existence of 
the subject. In Part Two and Three we tried to show that the time period of the early twentieth 
century, made a turn towards universal commodification having the explicit effect of creating a 
state of givenness, participation therein creating a state of nihilism and the objectification of the 
subject. To qualify this statement, it may perhaps be easier to understand that this nihilism is not 
as severe and overwhelming and yet still possesses an anomic and alienating quality. In fact, we 
just described the state as one of “complacency, happiness, contentment, and indifference” as well, 
relating the commodity structure to the falling prey of Heidegger, we get an added definition via 
Heidegger of that of “tranquillization”: “This tranquillization in inauthentic being . . . [causes the 
subject to drift] toward an alienation in which its own potentiality for being-in-the-world is 
concealed” (Heidegger 1992: 166). In other words, an artificial happiness. 
 It is here important to understand how and what postmodernity is. It represents a specific 
time period: “Marxists and non-Marxists alike have come around to the feeling that at some 
point following World War Two, a new kind of society began to emerge (variously described as 
post-industrial society, multinational capitalism, consumer society, media society and so forth). 
New types of consumption; planned obsolescence; an ever more rapid rhythm of fashion and 
styling changes; the penetration of advertising, television, and the media generally to a hitherto 
unparalleled degree throughout society [ed. See: objects of technology]” (Jameson 1998: 19). 
Further, Terry Eagleton writes that post-modernism represents a time period where exists a 
“degree of skepticism about the objectivity of truth . . . [and that] springs from the historic shift 
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in the West to a new form of capitalism—to the ephemeral, decentralized, world of technology, 
consumerism and the culture industry” (Eagleton 1996: vii).  
 In the postmodern ethos, we are bereft of any former guideposts of culture or valuation, 
and are left to manufacture surrogate values with little to no historical precedent. Postmodern 
milieu represents the moment where the Western individual finds themselves after they have 
passed through and are existing in commodity structure, falling prey state of either passive or 
active nihilism. Further, it represents a point where the construction of valuation comes from the 
curative of aesthetic of creating an art object, or through the process of becoming an art object. 
 Approaching redemption in this area requires that we find within an art object, by way of 
its negative space it possesses by not being immediately encompassed, the truth or freedom that I 
elucidated earlier. This redemptive nature of the art object, equitable with Adorno’s general 
notion of aesthetics is one that “retrieve[s] that which had been lost by the ideological 
preeminence of the subject of bourgeois philosophy in both its Enlightenment-rational and 
romantic irrational forms . . . [using] ‘negative dialectics’, the subject retained contact with the 
object appropriating it” (Buck-Morss 132). To put it another way, we seek an object in the art 
object such that it acts in a non-conceptual semblance that would disallow it from falling victim 
to the intentionality of the artist; the art object flees the conceptualization that would thereby 
“devalue” (Adorno 94) it. 
 Here we will revisit our earlier discussion of the types of objects, specifically the art 
object. My position is that the art object has certain specific criteria. 1) it may be anything 
crafted by a person, with the intention of each piece being non-identical to any other of the same 
kind, 2) the crafting of the piece by the subject must involve some potential for failure, 3) the 
object crafted should represent a form not-to-be-overcome rationally, and should aim at being a 
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“surrogate” and yet authentic form of existential crises for the artist, and preferably to the 
audience; 4) the intention of the artist cannot primarily be for any material gains; 5) the artist 
must have developed some mastery of their craft prior to accomplishing the work; 6) the object 
crafted, itself must carry the potential to convey truth and freedom to perhaps not only the artist 
who crafted it, but as well, to any other subject through its creation in a state of unintentional or 
unencompassed intoxication; the greater the work of art, the more universal this quality is. This 
last criteria is in direct response to Adorno’s negative dialectics, and represents the key to the 
salvation of the subject living in post-modernity in truth, freedom, and authenticity. There is one 
main caveat to the above definition of art: namely, that the relation between subject and object is 
one of entanglement such that the entanglement itself has the inherent relation to the commodity 
structure. Therefore, the art object itself is informed and takes shape via the facticity of the 
present, and yet stands for the freedom of creation, and produces an authenticity that mirrors the 
authentic becoming of the subject. 
 As I mentioned before, the moment of authenticity prerequires an inauthentic falling 
prey-ness of the subject. In Heidegger, we have already described how the being-in-the-world, 
for us, represents the commodity structure and gives commodities for us ready-made. We also 
spelled out how this being in the commodity structure is part of our constitution, or facticity, 
informing our existence; for commodities, unlike art objects, are themselves inauthentic, and our 
participating in them precludes our own level and degree of inauthentic Being. Further, the 
They-self, aware of this nihilistic deficiency in authenticity seeks to tempt us with commodities 
wearing the “skins” of authenticity (Miklitsch 72). 
 We may think of an Urban Outfitter selling a new t-shirt with a traditional Navajo print, 
itself a commodity with the “skin” of authenticity, where truly the “body” or essence of the garb 
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reflects not the deceptive meaning, but lies ciphered in a “constellation of construction” whereby 
the entire commodity culture itself may be revealed. In this way, commodity is able to brand 
itself, pretending to be what it is not. And by the way of identifying with the given object of 
inauthenticity prevailing in our society, then, it follows that the subject will much more readily 
find truth in making one’s own art object, thereby actively participating in one’s own 
authenticity. Further, “in the work, the happening of truth is at work” (Heidegger 2008: 183), and 
this “unconcealment . . . [of our own being] puts us into such a condition of being that in our 
representation we always remain installed within and in attendance upon unconcealment” (ibid. 
177). Therefore, the process of creating art objects at once unconceals the factic reality of not 
only nihilism, but also produces authentic objects that come from freedom also possess the 
mystery of negative space. 
 If in Heidegger’s concept of the art object, we attain to descriptions of truth and 
authenticity, we look now at Nietzsche and first his relation to art, and then to his notion of the 
Übermensch as aesthetic prescriptions for redemption of the subject through becoming an art 
object.  
 How we can relate Nietzsche’s notion of the aesthetic to Adorno’s dialectic involves 
Nietzsche’s description of art: “For art to exist, for any sort of aesthetic activity or perception to 
exist, a certain physiological precondition is indispensable: intoxication. Intoxication must first 
have heightened the excitability of the entire machine: no art results before that happens” 
(Rambley 219). This intoxication mirrors almost precisely what Adorno spoke of earlier of a 
seeming unintentional, immanently perceived, non-conceptual participation with the object, as 
such that it happens in a near lightening moment of play, that comes from the confrontation of 
just such an object-not-to-be-overcome. This potential of an art object contrasts in kind from the 
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sort of objectivized object, and the objectified subject, that represents the objects complete lack 
of freedom, both for itself and the subject. For Nietzsche, art is epitomized in the guise of 
Dionysus, and the latter the reified object, the visage of the Greek god Apollo. The former relates 
to this intoxication, the latter, to the dream (Nietzsche 2012: 83).  
 Lastly, the prescriptive remedy for the state of postmodernity, we find in the mode of 
being for the subject as a falling prey, or an “objectified”, commodified subject,  the act of 
freedom requires an active working or creating. What Nietzsche prescribes is an active form of 
nihilism represented by the Übermensch. This “active nihilism can open up the space for the re-
valuation of values, for what we will designate a transfiguration, a project of self-fashioning” 
(Milchman and Rosenberg 48). Nietzsche as well equates these subjects who can live in 
resolved, active nihilism as “’free spirits,’ ‘a spirit that has become free, that has again taken 
possession of itself,’ to affect a self-overcoming of what he designated as Christian-Platonic 
man, with its basis in the ascetic ideal, and thus to overcome the metaphysical need, and to give 
rise to the creation of new values” (Ibid. 49). The Übermensch thus stands as the individual, 
“who can live in a world without meaning,” (Ibid) and thus, actively participates in the becoming 
of themselves. 
 In these two ways, the construction of the art object, and the subjective becoming authentic, 
we find the aesthetic redemption of the postmodern subject.  
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Part Five: Conclusion 
 In this paper, we have tried to show that the former dialectic relationship of subject/object 
that informed the positive Absolute Idealism of Hegel and the positive material dialectic of Marx 
have been insufficient to adequately derive truth and freedom from the object in postmodern 
times. Part and parcel to this situation has been the entanglement implicit in the falling prey-ness 
of the objectified and commodified subject within the commodity structure. Further, we have 
tried to show that it is Adorno’s negative dialectic that offers the subject a tool for the 
decipherment of its own facticity of being-in-the-world. This world, for those in the late capital 
countries of the West, has produced universal commodification by putting artificial valuation and 
even devalued both the object and then the subject resulting in nihilism. This phase of nihilism 
represents the horizon of postmodernity that is experienced in everyday life with the potential for  
creating value through either the givenness of the commodity structure to construct ourselves 
with inauthentic constellations of meaning, or through art objects, and the self-overcoming 
implied through Nietzsche’s Übermensch that together, represent the potential for the 
postmodern subject to access truth, freedom and authenticity; perhaps representing the last 
positive freedom available to the subject. 
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